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"AN

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CONSTITUTION"-A COMMENT
By

JAmES PARKER HALL.'

The editor-in-chief of the REVIEW has asked me to comment
upon Mr. Johnstone's very interesting paper. I should not disagree with his ultimate proposal to amend the amending clause of
the federal constitution so as to permit a constitutional amendment
to be proposed by a majority of each house of Congress at two consecutive sessions, and to be adopted by the concurrent vote of a
majority of the people and a majority of the states. I think, however, that the paper.somewhat exaggerates the difficulty of amending the present constitution, as witness the sixteenth and seventeenth amendments now well on their way toward ratification; and
I am quite sure that it underestimates the power the federal government now has to deal with our important national problems.
The -powers upon which the United States must chiefly rely in
dealing with the problems mentioned by Mr. Johnstone are the
power to regulate commerce among the -states and with foreign
nations, the power of taxation, and the power over the postal
service.

The federal courts have construed the commerce clause to include all intercourse that crosses a state line, and thus defined it
appears to include all activities substantially affecting the transportation of any kind of property or property symbol, the transmission
of intelligence in any form, and all modes of personal travel. Doubtless the transmission of any form of energy will also be included
when the case arises. 3 The courts have also been liberal in includ1. Dean of the University of Chicago Law School.
2. The substance of much of the following comment is taken from a
paper of the writer read before the Western Economic Society at Chicago,
in March, 1912.
3. By an act of Congress approved Aug. 13, 1912, every one within the
jurisdiction of the United States is forbidden to operate any apparatus for
radio-communication as a means of commercial intercourse among the several states, or with foreign nations, or upon any vessel of the United States
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, or for the transmission of radiograms or signals the effect of which extends beyond the jurisdicion of the
state or territory in which the same are made or interferes with the reception of radiograms or signals from beyond said jurisdiction-except under
and in accordance with the terms of a revocable license granted by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor.
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ing within the notion of "intercourse" activities that are incidental
to the actual intercourse or transmission itself. Thus, the sale or
the solicitation of the sale of commodities for the purpose of transmission between the states, or their sale for the first time in the
original packages after transmission have been held to be part of
interstate commerce itself. But the production of commodities,
whether by manufacturing, agriculture, mining, or fishing, has repeatedly been said to be no part of such commerce. The interstate
transportation or marketing of goods may thus be controlled by
Congress (the Sherman Anti-Trust law being an instance of such
control), but is there any method by which it might indirectly also
control capitalization and production? I venture to suggest that
there are several ways in which, if desired by Congress, this could
be done.
In the first place the power to regulate interstate commerce is
given to Congress unqualifiedly, and is subject to no limitation except the general prohibitions upon congressional action to be found
in the constitution, the most important of which in this connection
is that liberty and property shall not be taken without due process
of law. It is apparently well settled that Congress may exercise its
granted powers for any purpose it pleases (subject to the abovementioned prohibitions), even though the object and effect of its
action be to accomplish indirectly what it could not do by direct
action. For instance, Congress has no power .directly to prohibit
lotteries in a state. It did, however, forbid the transmission of lottery matter through the mails-not at all in the interest of the postal
service as such, or in furtherance of any other power granted to
Congress, but solely in order to embarrass the operations of lotteries in states where they were legal and where Congress was under
the constitution powerless directly to forbid them. 4 When this
hindrance to lotteries proved insufficient, Congress absolutely forbade the carriage of lottery tickets from one state to another under
its power to regulate interstate commerce. Obviously no commercial object was sought by this-only the suppression of lotteries
in places where under the constitution they were legal. But the law
was upheld on the ground that Congress could regulate interstate
By an act of Congress approved July 31, 1912, it is made unlawful to
bring into the United States, or to deposit in the mails or with a carrier for
carriage, or to send or carry between any states or territories of the United
States or the District of Columbia, any pictorial representation of any pugilistic encounter which may be used for public exhibition.
4. In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110 (1892).
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commerce for any purpose not forbidden by the constitution, not
5
merely for purposes granted by the constitution.
In like manner, may not Congress indirectly control methods of
production in industry in a state by forbidding the privileges of
interstate commerce to the product unless its rules regarding production are complied with? Witness the Meat Inspection law, which
excludes from interstate commerce all meat not submitted to federal
inspection, and the Pure Food and Drugs law which requires the
proper labeling of these articles before their admission to interstate
commerce. It may be argued that these laws aim at securing more
healthful articles of commerce and the prevention of fraud in commerce. Granted-but what was the object of the law against lottery tickets ? Not to prevent sickness or fraud, but to suppress an
economic and social evil. And so the recent federal law against
bringing women into a state for immoral purposes has no commercial object, but only a moral one.6
Now, Congress cannot directly forbid child labor in North
Caroline, or a 12-hour day in the Pittsburg steel mills, but, if it
wishes seriously to hinder such practices, can it not forbid the products of such labor from being carried to other states, where they
compete with products produced under better but more expensive
conditions, and so tend to render economically difficult or impossible
the maintenance of improved conditions in industry elsewhere?
One of the stock arguments against laws for the betterment of industrial conditions in every state has been the protest, "If you make
us do that, we can't compete with employers in other states who don't
have to do it." Surely Congress may as readily use its commercial
powers to prevent sweat-shop and child-labor competition in interstate commerce, as to secure freedom from combination, or fraud,
or gambling in that commerce.
In the second place, Congress probably has considerably more
power over corporations engaged in interstate commerce than it
would have over individuals similarly engaged. As practically all
business important enough to require federal regulation is conducted
5. Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).

6. 36 Stat. 825, c. 395. See especially § 6, requiring all persons harboring alien girls for immoral purposes to file statements regarding them- with
the federal authorities. The power of the United States to require information is very extensive, and in regard to certain matters publicity alone is
a very effective mode of regulation even without legislation. The United
States could doubtless go far along this line.
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by corporations, this consideration is of great importance. The
argument that appears to establish it runs as follows:
The right to become a corporation or to act in corporate form
is not a natural right of individuals protected from arbitrary interference by the liberty and due process clauses of our constitutions,
as it is the right to engage individually in harmless business pursuits.
The right to act in cor1orate form is a franchise, permission to
exercise which must be granted by a government, state or national,
before it can lawfully be exercised by anyone for any purpose no
matter how innocent. Thus, Illinois could not deny absolutely to
individuals the right to sell wholesome sugar as an article of food,
or to till the soil-these being arbitrary interferences with the
natural liberty of the individual. But Illinois may decline, for any
reason or for no reason, to grant to anyone a franchise to sell sugar
or to conduct farming operations in corporate form, and may thus
confine these activities to individual effort. What Illinois may absolutely forbid, it may of course grant on terms, and so may require,
as the price of its consent to a grant of corporate privileges, that
corporations submit to exactions and regulations that could not be
demanded from individuals. The state may thus gain the right to
supervise a corporation's issues of stock and bonds, its methods of
production and distribution, its obligations to employes and to the
public, and all of the details of its organization and business, including its rates and dividends.
As regards corporations of other states seeking to do business
in Illinois the same principles apply, with two exceptions. Illinois
may, of course, if it sees fit, admit foreign corporations to do business there without restriction. If Illinois takes no action whatever
upon the matter, it is assumed to assent to this; but, if it dissents,
foreign corporations must submit to such terms as Illinois may prescribe for admission to do business in the state. The two exceptions
to this are corporations employed in the service of the United States,
and those engaged in interstate commerce. Such corporations may
not be excluded by a state, because the business in which they are
engaged is by the constitution placed within the control of the
United States instead of the separate states.
Now, what control has Congress over corporations engaged in
interstate commerce? Has it not the same power over them that
the states have over those engaged in purely internal commerce?
And, if'so, may it not use this power of corporate control as rigorously as the states may and do? The argument from analogy seems
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strong. A state-chartered corporation may engage in interstate
commerce until Congress dissents, just as a New Jersey corporation
may do internal business in Illinois until Illinois dissents. If Illinois chooses, hovever, it may require a license from the foreign
corporation, the compliance with conditions laid down by the state,
or even reincorporation in Illinois, as a prerequisite to the doing of
internal business in Illinois in corporate form. So, also, it would
seem that the United States could require state corporations doing
interstate commerce either to obtain a federal license, comply with
conditions laid down by Congress, or take out federal charters
altogether, as a prerequisite to engaging in interstate commerce in
corporate form.
If so, what conditions may be imposed as the price of either
license or charter? If a charter is required, of course stock and
bonds may be regulated as well as all other details of corporate
management. If a license is required it may be conditioned upon
compliance with congressional regulations as to production, distribution, methods of competition, publicity of accounts, prices, and
so forth, that would give Congress a virtual control over many matters other than those directly connected with the interstate transmission of commodities by such corporations. If Congress has the
same measure of control over interstate commerce by corporations
that a state has over internal commerce by corporations, such conditions would be valid; and the convenience and necessity of carrying on large businesses in corporate form would compel the acceptance of such conditions proviaed they were at all reasonable. The
nature of a corporation as the basis of governmental control must
play an important part in the legal theory of any thoroughgoing
measure of federal regulation of business.
In the third place, Congress is likely to find the power of taxation an important instrument of regulation. The power to levy
taxes (except upon exports) is conferred upon the United States
without express limitation, save that direct taxes must be apportioned and all taxes must be geographically uniform throughout the
states. It has been decided that this power of taxation is not confined to cases where the object and effect of the law is to raise
revenue, but that the United States may tax where the result is
regulation or prohibition of the act or object taxed. In 1902 Congress imposed a tax of 10 cents a pound upon all artificially colored
oleomargarine, an amount assumed to be prohibitive of its manufacture. Congress, of course, had no direct power to prohibit the
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manufacture of this article in a state, but the tax was upheld by
the Supreme Court, a decision which seems to establish in regard
to taxation the principle previously recognized in regard to the postal
and commercial powers of the United States-that they may be
exercised for any indirect purpose not so7 arbitrary as to be a taking
of property without due process of law.
Within this principle Congress may apparently regulate the
purely internal business of a state by taxing objectionable features
of it so heavily that they will no longer be profitable. Regulation by
taxation may thus become an important item in future governmental
programs. One instance of it we have already in operation as incidental to the present federal tax upon corporate earnings, namely
corthe requirement of a certain amount of publicity regarding
8
porate business. The Esch Phosphorus law is another.
Finally, as a last resort, Congress might deny the privileges of
the mails to businesses, which, though operating wholly within a
state, persisted in practices that Congress within a reasonable discretion saw fit to disapprove, following the precedent of the lottery
cases. What Congress may feel disposed, upon occasion, to do here,
may perhaps be indicated by its recent act requiring most classes of
periodicals to file with the postmaster general and to publish themselves a sworn statement giving the names and addresses of their
editors, publishers, business managers, and owners; their stockholders, if a corporation; their known bondholders, mortgagees. or
other security holders; and, in the case of daily papers, the average
number of copies sold or sent to paid subscribers during the preceding six months, under penalty of exclusion from the mails for
failure t6 comply therewith. The additional provision that all
editorial or reading matter, for the publication of which payment
has been made or promised, shall be marked "advertisement," is
perhaps invalid because not expressly confined to publications using
the mails; but the addition of a few words would remedy this and
leave in force an act to preserve these powerful and indispensable
9
agencies of public opinion from fraudulent and secret influences.
7. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904).
8. Act approved April 9, 1912, taxing white phosphorus matches 2 cents
a hundred, a prohibitive tax designed to prevent the manufacure of such
matches on account of the effect of white phosphorus upon the health of
those employed in match factories.
9. Act of Congress of Aug. 24, 1912, §2.
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